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Beyond Tweets and Screams: Action for Empowerment and Accountability in 
Nigeria – The Case of the #BBOG Movement  
Tade Akin Aina, Martin Atela, Ayo Ojebode, Plangsat Dayil and Fatai Aremu 
 
Summary 
This paper explores the nature, role and dynamics of new forms of social and political action as 
pathways to empowerment and accountability in fragile conflict- and violence-affected settings in 
Africa. Through an in-depth analysis of the case of the Bring Back Our Girls (#BBOG) movement 
in Nigeria and a multi-methods approach, the paper provides new knowledge that addresses 
evidence gaps in the following areas: 
 
1. the multiple ways through which social and political action play out in fragile, conflict- and 
violence-affected settings; 
2. whether the conditions in which new forms of social and political action applicable to 
fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings – the settings most dominant in African 
countries – emerge as currently projected in the literature; and 
3. whether these social and political actions necessarily produce accountability and 
empowerment in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings. 
 
Although often expressed as contentious and/or unruly politics, experiences from the BBOG 
movement suggest that the new forms of social and political action possess a wide range of 
implications for citizen action and governance, including leading to multiple forms of 
empowerment in fragile settings. Instances of empowerment emerging from the BBOG 
movement include: direct training of #BBOG activists and stakeholders in political leadership; 
management and communications; linking the victims of abduction and their relatives to key and 
influential actors within and outside Nigeria; consistently making the case of the abducted girls 
irrepressibly visible both nationally and internationally; and providing a platform for members to 
voice their concerns and directly confront those in power, including using evidence to challenge 
perceived mistruths by those in authority. In these ways, the #BBOG empowered different actors 
who were part of the movement’s protests in different ways. 
 
On accountability, the #BBOG also contributed to making government responsive and 
accountable in a number of ways. Some of their actions can be said to have significantly led to 
some of the steps taken by government toward the rescue of the abducted girls. 
 
The study also found that to effectively understand social and political actions in fragile conflict- 
and violence-affected settings, one must take into account the overall, often contradictory, and in 
many cases, specific complexities of such settings. Neither the settings nor the social and 
political actions are static or homogenous. Timing, and the specific ways actions are organised 
and deployed, matter. Furthermore, the ways actions are expressed often change over time and 
across geographies even in the same national contexts. Studies like this are therefore important 
efforts to explore and make sense of the intertwined complexities of contexts, actors, actions 
and methodologies. While acknowledging the multiple and diverse experiences that exist 
elsewhere, it notes the paucity of research on this phenomenon in Africa. 
 
Keywords: social and political action; Bring Back Our Girls; BBOG; empowerment; accountability; 
fragile; conflict and violence-affected settings; Chibok community; Chibok girls. 
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Executive summary 
What turns a one-off event into a sustained social movement and social mobilisation and protest 
effort that has survived for nearly five years? How did a spontaneous demonstration around the 
abduction of over two hundred secondary school girls in a relatively obscure location in North 
Eastern Nigeria become the focus of national and global attention and has remained so since 
2014? This is the focus and concern of this study. 
 
On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram insurgents abducted 276 schoolgirls from Chibok Secondary 
School, Borno State North East Nigeria. This event became a tipping point for the formation of 
the #Bring Back Our Girls movement, a group that began online on 23 April 2014, and appeared 
on the streets on 30 April 2014. Led largely by women, the #BBOG had one objective: a demand 
for the immediate rescue of the abducted schoolgirls. However, the initial protest, originally 
meant to be a one day march has lasted for more than four years and has recorded 
unprecedented global prominence and some local success. The #BBOG therefore provides an 
important opportunity for investigating how new forms of social and political actions emerge and 
are sustained, and whether social and political actions produce empowerment and accountability 
in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings (FCVAS). 
 
This study consisted of participant observation: during 12 #BBOG marches; through 32 in-depth 
interviews with #BBOG leaders; with members and leaders of the Chibok community in 
Maiduguri and in Chibok (including an abducted girl’s parent); and six months of participatory 
online tracking of the #BBOG. 
 
The study finds that the #BBOG employed a series of strategies that explained its viability and 
resilience. This includes combining an unrelenting focus on the abducted Chibok girls while 
initiating an elastic circle of concerns often related to abductions, kidnapping and gender-based 
violence that kept generating fresh sets of stakeholders. The movement also adopted an 
approach of non-militancy or what is better termed as a rejection of the methods of unruly 
politics characterised by violent demonstrations and street protests. In contrast, the #BBOG 
protests and demonstrations were orderly and often well-choreographed. The movement 
resisted the temptations to turn violent or be provoked into unruliness and violence by counter-
demonstrators. Finally, #BBOG utilised disciplined and near puritan principles about funding, 
particularly a clear definition of acceptable sources of the movement’s funding. The movement 
employed multiple tools and channels of communications within (with activists and other 
stakeholders in Nigeria) as well as outside the country.  
 
Using these multiple approaches and tactics, the movement succeeded in an unrelenting 
keeping of the global and national limelight, through a focused lens on the plight of the key 
affected stakeholders (the abducted girls, soldiers at the battle fronts, the Chibok community, 
and the internally displaced persons) of the Chibok abduction and Boko Haram conflict. In some 
instances, it was successful in exacting some form of accountability from the government and in 
recruiting and empowering activists and (future) social and political actors interested in and 
engaged with the issues. Like all such movements in similar contexts, the #BBOG movement 
faced and continue to face many challenges of both internal and external nature. 
 
The key research question for this study was – does social and political action in fragile, conflict- 
and violence-affected settings produce empowerment and accountability outcomes? The 
findings suggest a cautious affirmative answer. There was evidence that pointed to 
empowerment and accountability outcomes, but the question remains about the extent and 
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depth of these outcomes particularly in regard to governance and development. Given the 
ongoing nature of the social and political actions of the #BBOG, the extent and significance of 
these outcomes are still very much work-in-progress. However, the conditions of fragility that 
necessitated the social and political action in the first instance also work to limit its impact. 
Therefore, to be effective, even minimally, what constitutes social and political action in fragile 
conflict- and violence-affected settings must be seen in relation to the overall often contradictory 
and in some cases, specific complexities and multiple internal contradictions of such settings. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Under which conditions and in what ways do some forms of social and political action in fragile 
conflict-affected and violent settings provide pathways to the empowerment of citizens and the 
accountability of governments and rulers? Why do some protest movements endure and persist 
while others even when initiated with similar energy and significant collective sense of grievance 
and outrage soon fizzle out and are not sustained? These two questions constitute the core of 
the study of the #Bring Back Our Girls (#BBOG) movement reported in this working paper. In 
attempting to answer these questions, the study explores and analyses the emergence, patterns 
and dynamics, of new forms of social and political action in fragile conflict-affected and violent 
settings, such as in Nigeria. The study also explores the governance and other implications of 
current changes in the ways that protests and social and political action are organised, delivered 
and sustained in the often unpredictable conditions of fragile conflict- and violence-affected 
settings. Furthermore, it looks into the boundaries and dimensions of interventions by both 
internal and external actors and the multiplicity of strategies and instruments available to and 
deployed by them. 
 
The literature on social and political actions, although predominantly coming from outside of 
Africa, suggest that social and political action is a pathway to the empowerment of citizens and 
the accountability of governments and rulers. Historical and other studies of the outcomes of the 
actions of social movements suggest that social and political actions expand the democratic 
space (Andrews 1997); shift government policy (Burstein and Linton 2002; Mottiar and Lodge 
2017); expand social capital (Diani 1997); and generate resources for collective actions and 
interventions (Andrews 2001). A common feature of these studies and others like them is that 
they hinge the consequences or outcomes of social and political actions on a number of 
conditions either internal to the social movement or external, or both. The import of this is that 
one must be cautious about unproblematised and unpacked generalisations across movements, 
regions or settings. While we often see broad elements of citizen actions, pressures on 
governments and varying degrees of responsiveness, each case of social and political action is 
often determined by specific points in time and the contexts in which they are operating. Other 
important determinants include the nature and make-up of the individual and collective actors, 
the interactions between internal and external conditions and how these constrict, neutralise or 
expand the boundaries of action.  
 
The above points (on determinants) necessitate an in-depth and nuanced analyses beyond the 
generalisations in the current literature. A focussed in-depth analysis is further reinforced by 
some other observations about the circumstances of this particular study. The first is that the 
literature on social and political actions is predominantly skewed towards studies coming from 
more politically stable settings and so called relatively advanced democracies. Although there 
are scattered studies focussing on social movements and collective action in Africa, social and 
political actions and their implications for empowerment and accountability in FCVAS – such as 
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Nigeria – have received limited attention. Yet, such settings are the terrains of a wide range of 
new social and political actions in contemporary times. Furthermore, the explosion in the 
information and communications technologies has had great impact on how groups mobilise and 
organise, and how issues get easily globalised. This in turn could influence accountability and 
empowerment outcomes of social movements.  
 
The Bring Back Our Girls (#BBOG) movement provides a useful case for an in depth and 
serious examination and reflection of the outcomes of social and political actions in FCVAS, in 
the era of information and communications technologies. Following the abduction of 276 
schoolgirls in Chibok, North East Nigeria, on 14 April 2014, the BBOG erupted online, earning 
the nomenclature #BBOG, and on the streets of a few Nigerian cities in the form of 
demonstrations, marches, sit-outs and protest meetings. It soon developed a somewhat 
discernible structure and a battery of strategies and tactics. Among these strategies was the 
massive use of online platforms, especially Twitter and Facebook. 
 
This study focuses on the #BBOG movement in answering the questions: do social and political 
actions in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings produce empowerment and 
accountability? If so, under what conditions do these happen? To answer these questions, the 
emergence, operational strategies, challenges and impact of the BBOG in terms of 
empowerment and accountability were carefully examined. In doing this, we recognise that there 
are ambiguities in the ways different respondents described the nature, composition and even at 
times the operations of the movement. Activists and regular participants in the #BBOG utilise 
different words to describe or explain what the movement is engaged with, how it is structured, 
their participation and engagement with the movement. The ambiguity itself is related to the 
looseness of its organisation and structure. It is possible to consider this as part of the flaws in 
design or to see it as one of the strengths through which the #BBOG movement’s broad mission 
is realised in unintended ways. The rest of this working paper deals with the different aspects of 
this issue and how it contributes to the key questions of this study. 
 
 
2  Nigeria: a nation still in the making:  
Nigeria has a long and complex political and social history which necessitates a thorough 
understanding and characterisation of the social and political state and other important 
situational dynamics. It is important that analysis and characterisation of the very complex total 
entity be subjected to carefully nuanced considerations that recognise, for instance, that in some 
instances and spaces, state capacities are lacking, and in others, particularly when it comes to 
some forms of citizen repression and elite rent seeking, the state can appear as immensely 
strong (Pierce 2006). The same nuancing applies to the notions of fragility and other elements of 
understanding the political economy, the plurality of national societies, and the political culture of 
this entity that remains an immense political and economic work-in-progress but yet lacks any 
identifiable and uncontested unilineal trajectory in its unfolding. It is therefore in many ways an 
evolving and at times contradictory political and economic entity and reality.  
 
But several aspects of this reality remain significant to the ways Nigerians carry out their daily 
struggles of gaining livelihoods, making meanings of their lives and claiming their rights and 
entitlements within the limited boundaries of citizenship, economic and social inclusion and 
access to opportunities for the pursuit of their wellbeing. National cohesion and integration and 
any significant elite consensus on national vision and direction is still very much in early stages 
of formation. Social and political actions are often simultaneously bounded and expanded by the 
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complex structures and dynamics of this history and the economy and society in which citizens 
find themselves. This brief context provides indicative landmarks of the terrain in which the 
current interest of study the #Bring Back Our Girls movement has emerged. 
 
As at 2016, Nigeria’s population was estimated to be over 193 million, with an annual population 
growth rate of 3.2 per cent, and over 41 per cent of the population being under the age of 15 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2018). As the most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts 
for 47 per cent of West Africa’s population and one of the largest populations of youth in the 
world (World Bank 2019). Nigeria has more than 350 ethnic groups with a wide array of different 
customs, languages, and traditions (ibid.). The country also has large numbers of inhabitants 
across different religions. The diversity and plurality in Nigeria across ethnic and religious 
identities, and the often interlocking and overlapping nature of these identities, are important as 
they have been utilised by opportunistic political leaders as key platforms for cleavages, 
fractures and realignments in the country’s politics. The diversity and plurality also remain one of 
the serious challenges to building effective and engaged citizenry (Falola 1999; Suberu 2001).  
 
Another key element of Nigeria’s political economy is its vast petroleum resources, which have 
helped to create a massive ‘rentier’ economy fuelling graft and corruption and insulating the 
elites from the accountability that a reliance on citizens’ taxes tend to create. Nigeria is one of 
the leading petroleum oil exporters in Africa, and has the largest natural gas reserves on the 
continent (Oxford Business Group 2019). As of 2015, Nigeria was the world's 20th largest 
economy, worth more than $500 billion and $1 trillion in terms of nominal GDP and purchasing 
power parity respectively (ibid.). But all these appear to be under threat following the global 
shocks that affected the domestic price of petroleum products and the concurrent instability of 
the national currency, the Naira, against the US Dollar. Other serious threats to national stability 
and growth include the re-emergence of the separatist agitation for ‘Biafra’ in the South East; 
militancy in the Niger Delta; cattle rustling and rural banditry in parts of the Middle Belt and the 
Northern states; and the violent extremist Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, which has 
produced over two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These threats are aggravated by 
the decline in petroleum revenue which reduces the capacity of the national rentier state and its 
dominant elites to continue to purchase the support of the different elite groups and factions 
through various forms of patronage as was the case during the eras of petroleum revenue boom 
and the first few years of return to democratic electoral politics in 1999. 
 
It is important to also point out here the significance of insurgency and violent extremism in the 
understanding of the context of the #BBOG movement. Nigeria has been no stranger to 
insurgencies and extremist political movements. There was the Biafran war in the late 1960s, the 
Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s and there have been violent political uprisings and 
suppressions in the Middle Belt and the Delta regions of Nigeria. Insurgency around religion, 
particularly Islam has also existed in waves in North Eastern and parts of North Central and 
North Western Nigeria. But nearly none has matched the Boko Haram phenomenon in terms of 
the range and intensity of violence, abductions and kidnappings, the use of suicide bombers and 
the duration, territorial and geographical spread of the violence and conflict (Amnesty 
International 2015). Matfess (2017) in her unusually sympathetic analysis and exploration of the 
movement has provided both a record of some of these atrocities while at the same time 
exploring what appears to be a mixed and complex ambivalent situation of women, gender and 
gender-based violence in the Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram insurgency led to the 
abduction of women and girls and many more examples of kidnapping and gender-based 
violence in the North Eastern region of Nigeria. Between 2014 and Spring 2015, an Amnesty 
International Report estimated that Boko Haram had abducted more than 2,000 women 
(Amnesty International 2014). The Boko Haram insurgency and its atrocities was an ongoing 
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element in the contentions in Nigerian politics in terms of the state of security and citizen safety. 
However, with the abduction of the Chibok girls and the rise of #BBOG movement, it became a 
more important subject of national and international concern in Nigerian politics. 
 
The above issues locate Nigeria at a critical juncture in her political development with her 
democracy relatively recent, and the uncertainty about her capacity to survive significant political 
and economic shocks. Following the fifth consecutive national elections (since the restoration of 
electoral politics in 1999), held in March and April 2015, the former Military Head of State; Gen. 
Muhammadu Buhari, of the opposition party All Progressives Congress (APC), emerged as the 
winner. The elections represented a significant shift in power transition between political parties 
as it occurred after 16 years of rule by one hitherto dominant party. It was also seen as a strong 
expression of social and political action and the call for a change of government as the 
culmination of about 16 years of frustration under the former ruling party. It is important to note 
that this was a relatively peaceful transition to a different era under a new President. Since the 
election however, the Buhari government has concentrated on combating corruption, while also 
managing a rapidly weakening economy as a result of declining global oil prices and unresolved 
conflicts in the North East region, the Niger Delta and in the Middle Belt. While many Nigerians 
remain convinced by the ascetic antecedents of President Buhari and his professed commitment 
to transform the socio-economic conditions of the country, there is increasing restlessness and 
disillusionment by many who face severe economic hardships and are little convinced of the 
effectiveness of the government’s war on corruption.  
 
There is also a sense that the Buhari government has been slow to act, often indecisive and has 
tended to be very closed in its approach, with little public consultation or access outside of the 
tight inner circle of the Presidency sometimes described as a cabal. As the Buhari 
administration’s tenure comes to the close of its first term, the security situation in the North East 
has not improved in any significant manner. As pointed out above, the Boko Haram insurgency 
remains unresolved and the insurgents have splintered into different factions that have largely 
retained ferocious brutality and are not yet subdued. The splinter groups have also become 
more virulent with new connections to the international extremist group the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) and recurrent violent encounters with the Nigerian army and new 
abductions of peoples in the North Eastern region. As the 2019 elections draw nearer, and with 
much of the promises that brought President Buhari to power in 2015 still to be fulfilled, the 
situation has again grown more volatile. There is increasing tensions not only in the North 
Eastern region but in other parts of the country such as the Middle Belt and Delta areas. 
 
The popular response to these dissatisfactions with government in recent times has been a rise 
in new forms of social action, especially through flares of intense social media campaigns and 
sporadic public protests and demonstrations such as the enough is enough and the bring back 
our girls campaigns. We are therefore seeing an intensification of contentious politics and unruly 
political expressions (Tarrow 2011; Khanna et al. 2013). In many ways, the end of military rule 
and the restoration of democratic electoral politics lifted the lid off overt formal repressive 
authoritarian rule and has enhanced the spaces for the growth of these varieties of political 
expression. There has also been autonomous grassroots mobilisation initially, ostensibly around 
security in communities, but leading more to new levels of local power such as neighbourhood 
associations, residents’ groups and community development associations that mobilise their 
constituents and liaise with state agencies and politicians. An element of this below-the-radar 
organising is the formation of local vigilante groups which are often established by communities, 
residents’ associations and even some faith-based organisations. These are often groups of 
young people and some older citizens organised to provide security and civil defence work in 
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their communities. They patrol the neighbourhoods day and night, some carry weapons, gather 
intelligence and often work for and/or liaise closely with government security agencies.  
 
New forms of social and political actions are not limited to public dissatisfaction with deteriorating 
security conditions and lack of accountability among state officials and security agents. 
Economic and welfare discontent have spurred social and political actions. In the wake of the 
petroleum fuel price hike in late 2011, a coalition of civil society organisations, labour unions, 
student associations, popular artistes and random street groups mobilised mass protests that 
crystallised in the #OccupyNigeria movement and were marked by waves of unruly politics 
across major cities (see Hossain et al. 2018). It was the first major mass protest against an 
unpopular government policy decision in the Fourth Republic. The 2011 experience has since 
been repeated as the mode for public reaction and expression of discontent with unpopular 
policies and government actions. For instance, the widespread reactions to police brutality 
against innocent civilians by the specially constituted Police unit Special Anti-Robbery Squad 
(SARS), leading to the widespread #End SARS and #ReformPoliceNG campaigns. 
 
Another manifestation of new forms of social and political action with implications for 
empowerment and accountability is lodged in the organising and growth of faith-based 
organisations (FBOs). A recurring theme from the early scoping work by this research team is 
that FBOs, particularly the new Pentecostal churches, various grass roots organisations such as 
women’s groups and community based organisations, have moved into the spaces vacated by 
government and politicians over the past few years (Aina et al. 2016). Although these FBOs are 
predominantly Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian groups, the conventional Christian 
denominations and emerging Moslem groups are also actors in these new forms of social and 
political action. In many ways, these groups expand, claim, reinvent or bubble up new civic 
spaces as the government strives to close the existing conventional civic spaces through 
repressive legislations, administrative actions and regulations that reduce citizens’ access to 
information such as the imposition of higher taxes on internet and mobile data use. The 
resilience, versatility and inventiveness of grass roots and other social and political actors in 
relation to how they engage, manipulate and occupy the civic space is an area that requires 
further in-depth research in contexts like Nigeria. A concentration on formal and conventional 
civic spaces can lead to a failure to recognise the extent of social and political action deployed in 
relatively non-civic spaces and that repression in one sphere, can actually open up actions and 
expressions in other unexpected and unrelated spaces.  
 
What this complex evolving context of Nigerian political economy and a rapidly changing political 
culture and society is showing is the emergence of new waves of social and political mobilisation 
in Nigeria or what Tarrow (2011) has characterised as cycles of collective action. Much more 
needs to be understood about the role and actions of these new groups, the waves of the cycles 
of collective actions, their organisation and their impact on politics and governance. This paper 
serves that purpose by providing new knowledge on these emerging forms of social and political 
action through the exploration and analyses of the BBOG movement.  
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3  Structural determinants of empowerment and 
accountability 
As pointed out in the previous section, new forms of social and political actions are located 
within, bounded and determined by structures, actions and agency interacting within contexts 
that at times overlap and transcend geographical and territorial boundaries. A meaningful 
understanding and engagement with all of these require an interrogation of the concepts and 
notions that constitute the vehicles of the discourse around these issues. In this section, we 
attempt to clarify some of these notions and explore how they link and are interlinked with the 
various structural and other determinants of empowerment and accountability that are of interest 
to us in the study of the #BBOG movement. 
 
Certain key notions connected to the key question of how we understand new forms of social 
and political actions in fragile and conflict-affected settings and their implications for 
empowerment and accountability informed this study. These notions determine and connect 
both the study and analyses of the #BBOG movement carried out here. 
 
The first point that requires understanding is that although all of the notions of accountability, 
empowerment and FCVAS come together to characterise specific settings and actions, they are 
in no way the only mode of characterisation, neither is there a consensus on their definitions, 
use or application. Instead, they are contested notions and this study will benefit from an initial 
clarification of how they are used here. 
 
Beginning with the context of the study, namely its fragile and conflict-affected setting, the notion 
of fragility as applied to polities and societies has evolved from a focus on the state to a wider 
context of settings that constitute the arena of state-society relations. The notion often connotes 
a set of characteristics: weak state capacity; a lack of legitimacy and trust in government; a 
breakdown of confidence in institutions; a pervasiveness of fear; insecurity; weak social 
cohesion; pessimism about the future; and disempowerment of citizens (Haider and Mcloughlin 
2016). But fragility is neither homogenous nor monolithic. Neither is it static nor all pervasive. It 
is a condition and experience that is expressed in varying and diverse ways and degree within 
geo-political contexts. It is also manifested along a continuum in terms of intensity and presence. 
The World Bank defines fragility as ‘a problem not only of state capacity, but also of 
dysfunctional relationships across groups in society, including the relationships of different 
groups in the state. Rather than a static condition, fragility is better conceptualised as a dynamic 
continuum along which societies can experience… The continuum need not imply a linear 
process…’ (Marc et al. 2013: 13). Clarifying fragility here is important because it defines both the 
conditions and settings under which the Chibok girls were abducted by Boko Haram. It also 
defines the settings that gave rise to #BBOG and at the same time provided the opportunities 
and constraints for its operations. The findings of the study develop and explore these issues 
further. 
 
Moving from the context to the phenomenon itself, the #BBOG has been the subject of a variety 
of descriptions that consider it as a campaign, a process of social mobilisation, a protest group 
and a movement (Mills 2015; Olutokunbo et al. 2015; Matfess 2017). A rich and broad literature 
exists in the areas of social movements, social activism and social mobilisation (see for instance 
Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk 2009; Tarrow 2011). The African experience 
since the seminal work contained in the volume edited by Wamba dia Wamba and Mahmood 
Mamdani (1995) remains relatively undocumented. Without resorting to an African 
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exceptionalism, the core of the understanding of social movements refers to sustained collective 
actions and mobilisation around grievances and issues arising from the nature of state actions 
and policies or inactions. Social movements are in general sustained protest and/or demand and 
claims-making mobilisation and actions of citizens and peoples around social and political 
issues. They can be concerned with a single issue or a plurality of issues and are sustained by a 
wide range of resource mobilisation and networks. They also have distinct organisation and 
leadership and deploy a wide range of strategies. But as Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 
(1995), and Ellis and van Kessel (2009) have cautioned, we must be careful about how we 
impose Western categories of state-civil society analyses in our conceptualisation and definition 
of social movements in Africa.  
 
Ellis and van Kessel (2009) raised six important points that have implications for the 
understanding of the phenomenon of #BBOG movement. The first was the need for a nuanced 
understanding of the concept and nature of social movements in Africa in terms of their 
composition, organisation, issues, strategies and resources. They draw attention to the hybrid 
and at times syncretistic nature of the movements. Secondly, they emphasised the role of the 
international context and external actors in terms of interactions and flows of ideas, ideologies, 
beliefs, funding, logistics and networks. This international dimension is no longer uniquely 
Western-centric. China, Asia, the Emirates and India are also sources of influence. A significant 
factor but relatively less considered is the role of Diasporas. They point out that today 
remittances go beyond money and include ideas, ideologies both secular and religious, 
technologies and strategies. These are reinforced by the growth of new communications 
technologies and the volume, rapidity and instant nature of travels and communications. Also, 
contemporary social movements in Africa possess a wider repertoire of relationships and 
interactions with the state that go beyond the conventional adversarial and oppositional types to 
the more collaborative, cooperative and accommodationist types (Aina and Moyo 2013).  
 
Finally, there is the fact of the religious element as a recurring factor in several social 
movements and social mobilisation efforts in Africa. This introduces a syncretistic element and 
removes the strict dichotomy between secular social and political actions and collective actions 
embedded in religious garb or framed in religious idioms. The elements above to a great extent 
are reflected in the nature of the sustained collective action that #BBOG movement has become. 
 
Empowerment and accountability are two other important notions that frame this study. At the 
superficial level, empowerment seems to be a term that is easy to define, particularly as it has 
become a common word in Nigeria’s national political parlance. In its simplest sense, it is the 
process of giving power to someone else or to citizens. However, it is more complex. It is seen in 
the literature as a product of institutional transformation with an emphasis on inclusiveness, the 
enabling of others to act on their own behalf, responsiveness and accountability. The 
transformation that occurs is visible in situations of dominance and power relations, when 
erstwhile subjects and passive actors are enabled to reclaim their rights and voices and are 
empowered as active citizens who make demands, claim their rights and perform their duties 
and obligations (Grandvoinnet, Aslan and Raha 2015). Conceiving empowerment as what 
happens when institutional transformation occurs is inadequate in FVCAS where institutions are 
impervious and/or resistant to reforms or transformation. 
 
Green (2016) in his illuminating book that brings together activist insights with social and political 
theory and analysis in the understanding of how change happens, points us at an often 
unrecognised aspect of empowerment that is born of direct and concrete participation and is 
reported by some of the respondents of this study in their reflections. Narrating the experience of 
one of the subjects of his book, Green (ibid.: 28) noted thus: ‘…empowerment in real time… [is] 
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when light bulbs go on in the heads of people who had previously felt helpless or shackled by 
their lot, and they begin to take action to change it. Such small personal events often lie at the 
heart of the tides of social and political change…’ 
  
This and other forms of empowerment however occur in fragile conflict- and violence-affected 
settings and these can be completely missed or not recognised. The different and often 
contested narratives of alternative notions of empowerment are also lucidly captured by Matfess  
in her book on Women and the War on Boko Haram (2017: see 56-64). It is therefore, both a 
contested, sometimes ambivalent and transformative notion. In social and political theory, 
empowerment embodies the expression, engagement, bargaining with and contestation of 
power relations located in individual and collective interactions, actions and relations. 
Analytically, empowerment takes us into the world of power and systems analysis; an important 
framework along with others for understanding the dynamics of change in societies. As Green 
points out : ‘empowerment is not so much a single event as a process taking place in a complex 
replete with multiple feedback loops rather than linear chains of cause and effect’ (2016: 37). 
 
For some in the literature, empowerment is the ability of ordinary citizens to assess the 
performance and determine the political trajectory of their rulers. This has been linked to 
uprisings when rulers have been seen to have failed (Krastev 2014). Examples include 
contemporary experiences such as the uprisings and protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo, 
Independence Square in Kyiv, Taksim Square in Istanbul, Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan, 
and Altamira Square in Caracas. This understanding of the notion of empowerment remains 
questionable because it overlooks not only the place of individual empowerment but also the fact 
that effective assessment of government performance and collective action in demand-making 
themselves, constitute acts of empowered citizens in the first instance. 
 
Navigating the complex contours of the understanding of the notion as described above, this 
study applied an approach that attempts to embody structural determinants and individual and 
collective agency and perceptions. First, we understand empowerment as the ability to exercise 
volitional control over one’s affairs. Thus, empowerment entails individual determination over 
one’s life that leads to increased control over their own lives and a psychological sense of 
personal control and influence (Eyben 2011; Green 2016). Whether at the individual, community 
or organisational level, it is measured by the qualitative control, awareness and participation in 
social, economic and political spheres of life, accruing to citizens and individuals in any setting.  
 
Second, empowerment can be both an objective and subjective process or state. Cornwall 
defines it as ‘gaining a sense of power to shape the lives we live’ (2017: 5), and Eyben (2011: 2) 
defines it as a process through which ‘individuals or organised groups increase their power to 
achieve certain outcomes they need or desire’. Certain manifestations of empowerment are 
observable; other aspects depend on the individual who sees themselves as empowered or not. 
The subjective aspects of empowerment have implications for the manner in which 
empowerment is studied and call attention to contexts, feelings and perceptions. 
 
Third, empowerment is a process that applies in particular to the disadvantaged, all those 
groups who are seen to lack or are denied the power to articulate or act on their own individual 
or collective volitions and interests. These in our common patriarchal societies primarily include 
women and other conventionally dominated, socially excluded and marginalised groups (Eyben 
2011; Baliamoune-Lutz 2013). To scholars such as Combaz and Mcloughlin (2014), 
empowerment is not inclusive until women are protected against violence, supported to be 
active political players and allowed capacity to empower themselves.  
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Fourth, empowerment is found across various spheres of life: economic, cultural, social and the 
different forms reinforce each other leading to increased capacity, confidence, active presence 
and participation across different sectors. Especially in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected 
settings, the ability to express oneself, that is, freedom of speech is an important sign that the 
person is empowered. Freedom of speech and expression can lead to claims making to freedom 
of movement and association that could lead to presence, participation and activity in public 
spaces in the economic, cultural, social and political arenas. It must however not be forgotten 
that expressions and manifestations of empowerment do not occur simultaneously in equal 
weight and intensity across all spheres for groups and individuals. A stronger manifestation of 
empowerment can occur in economic or occupational spheres while the family, religious or 
political spheres are relatively weaker and this weighting can change not only across spheres 
but also over time and in different conditions. In fact, situations of conflict can at times empower 
women to take on roles abdicated by men at war or because there are not enough men to play 
what usually would have been conceived as masculine roles (Matfess 2017). A useful way to 
conceive of the notion and its practical expressions is to see it as operating on a continuum of 
intensity and depth across different spheres over time. 
 
Accountability is another difficult notion to capture because of its complexity. Yet, due to its 
importance for monitoring service delivery and the duties and responsibilities of government, 
influential global institutions such as the World Bank have attempted various schemas for its 
understanding and the operational use of its various dimensions. The World Bank has further 
provided what it calls both short and long routes to accountability based on a conception of the 
nature of political systems, service delivery, responsiveness and answerability (World Bank 
2004; Devarajan, Khamani and Walton 2011; Green 2016). 
 
Accountability, therefore, broadly refers to the processes, norms and structures that require 
(power-holders) to answer for their actions to another actor, and/or suffer some sanction if the 
performance is judged to be below the relevant standard. Especially typifying the relationship 
between the state and citizens, it specifies whom is in control of power and whom is customarily 
and legally empowered to hold those in power responsible for their actions (Nixon et al. 2017). 
Grandvoinnet et al., quoting the World Bank (2012), defined social accountability as ‘the extent 
and capability of citizens to hold the state accountable and make it responsive to their needs’ 
(2015: 2). In stable settings there are formal vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms. 
In fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings, social accountability is either considerably 
weak or absent. The ability of citizens to caution and question government officials and agencies 
is weak in such settings. As a result, external actors often have a role to play (Nixon et al. 2017). 
 
The relationship between empowerment and accountability is not straightforward and direct. The 
tendency, as found in parts of the literature, is that accountability is ineffective where 
empowerment is not present, enabled or guaranteed since individuals, communities or groups 
will lack the capacity to challenge poor service delivery; lack of inclusive growth and 
participation; and ineffective economic and social environments. There is the further position that 
accountability is meaningful when voice, participation and transparency are conceived of as its 
essential  fundamentals, with a significant focus on various opportunities and capabilities 
granted to the poor to influence what goes on in the public sphere (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015). 
Although, as we found in this study, a campaign focussed on pressuring the government to be 
accountable created some empowerment by-products. In the case of the #BBOG movement, the 
push for accountability came first, albeit with actors leading the movement already empowered 
by the fact of their education, socio-economic status and their activists’ credentials. However, in 
the collective struggles for accountability and government responsiveness, participants claimed 
they were empowered. 
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The Bring Back Our Girls movement set out to hold the Federal Government of Nigeria to its 
statutory pledge of protecting the security and safety of Nigerian citizens. Their demand was that 
the government should rescue the 276 abducted girls and return them safely to their families. In 
this study, we concerned ourselves with how successful the movement was in this regard and 
the strategies it employed. We are also interested in understanding the nature of empowerment 
that resulted from the activities of the group, and whose empowerment that was. 
 
 
4  Shaping and doing the study: research 
approach and methods 
The study adopted a multi-method concurrent interpretive design. This approach was useful in 
assessing the context in which #BBOG as a form of social and political action occurred, in 
describing the form and nature of the movement, and in identifying the specific pathways 
through which #BBOG led to and/or resulted in empowerment and accountability. A mixed-
methods approach was utilised particularly to obtain data critical for building deeper and broader 
information bases to allow for thick analyses (Mason 2006) into how the #BBOG movement 
works, how and when (if at all), it contributed to empowerment and accountability in the Nigerian 
setting. The multi-method approach enabled the research to probe aspects of motivation and 
impact of a unique movement and to deal with issues too personal and unpleasant to quantify. It 
was also useful in overcoming mutual suspicion and building trust with key research participants. 
Below, we detail the research process and the data collection methods used. 
 
4.1 Stakeholder mapping and engagement  
To lay the groundwork for the study, elaborate key stakeholder engagement exercises were 
conducted through in-country research scoping and stakeholder mapping in June and July 2016 
(see Aina et al. 2016). These began with initial in-country scoping visits (two in total) to Nigeria 
to assess the contextual appropriateness of Nigeria as a location for operationally relevant, 
robust and contemporary research on: the role of social and political action in fostering effective 
empowerment and accountability; the role of external actors in supporting these change 
processes; and the opportunities for research communication and uptake. The scoping visits 
enabled the research team to capture the perspectives of local activists, academics, funders, 
policy actors and practitioners on the actors, modalities and outcomes of social and political 
actions in the country. In addition to these, the perceptions of external actors and the 
interventions they support were also studied. Secondly, a political economy analysis was 
conducted and the key stakeholders (with power, interest, motivation and capacity to influence 
policy and programme uptake) on empowerment and accountability issues in Nigeria were 
identified. Through this exercise, an initial exploration and picture of the policy environment and 
communications channels and networks in Nigeria was obtained and this information was used 
to develop a research uptake strategy applied throughout the research process.  
 
4.2 Inception workshop and review of study design 
Given the complex nature of the study and the difficult research context (of fragility and conflict) 
within which it was undertaken, the study adopted innovative design and methods to collect data 
that incorporated empowerment of the women and other policy actors involved in the #BBOG 
movement. A two-and-a-half-day design workshop was held in July 2017 in Abuja. At this 
workshop, the stakeholders identified at the mapping stage above and the research team 
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discussed the research questions, identified the most appropriate methods for the study and the 
physical and other risks the research entailed. Participants, guided by experienced and 
knowledgeable facilitators, examined and discussed the most appropriate methodology to 
generate the data needed to answer the questions while ensuring they were context appropriate. 
Participants also reviewed ethical issues, and agreed on an appropriate research-to-policy plan. 
Stakeholders were accorded the opportunity to interact with the research team who explained 
the study focus and rationale. Participants asked questions that opened up discussions alerting 
researchers to divergent, yet critical, views on the study topic. In the end, the interest of 
stakeholders in the study was elicited, trust was built with stakeholders and their commitment to 
support the project and consider using the outcomes was assured. Finally, engaging the #BBOG 
leadership at these early stages of the research enabled the research team to develop rapport 
with the core leadership and to use this to gain acceptance that proved useful for obtaining 
interviews in subsequent data gathering.  
 
4.3 Participant observation  
An ethnographic approach that involved two researchers participating in and observing BBOG 
advocacy marches and sit-outs in Abuja and Lagos in December 2017 was adopted. These 
were done to carefully and systematically observe and document the operations, strategies and 
approaches of the movement in its campaign. Activities included participation in a three-day 
Advocacy March to the Presidential Villa from 11–13 December 2017 which attracted 25–30 
participants daily. In total, the researchers participated in twelve sessions of observations of 
#BBOG protests and sit-outs. Attention was paid to the settings of the marches and sit-outs, 
actions taken, and the actors involved. These observations along with in-depth interviews 
contributed immensely to the understanding and description of the movement. 
 
4.4 Online media tracking 
Five months of online media tracking of the activities of the #BBOG was mapped to trace the 
various actors driving the media discourse on the abducted girls. The tracking also documented 
the media platforms most used by the activists, where they were most visible, and which actors 
attracted high level of reactions in social media and the implications of the patterns found for 
empowerment and accountability in the Nigerian context. The activities of the #BBOG on 
Facebook and Twitter were tracked through Facebook and Twitter searches, and through 
Google Alerts. Non-participant observation method was combined with quantitative content 
analysis to collect relevant data. Facebook pages and Twitter accounts of the #BBOG were 
followed and the activities that took place in them were tracked daily. Google Alerts was created 
with the name ‘Bring Back Our Girls’. The analysis was based on alerts received from 1 January 
to 31 May 2018. Twitter and Facebook tracking and searches were also done over the same 
period. At the end of the tracking period, all posts on the Facebook page of the group and all 
tweets on its Twitter timeline were extracted and subjected to content analysis. Search on the 
two platforms was conducted using the search terms Bring Back Our Girls, BBOG, Chibok Girls 
and Dapchi Girls, all with and without the hashtag symbol. The Google Alerts received over the 
period were also subjected to content analysis.  
 
4.5 Survey  
Attempts at conducting online and face-to-face survey among #BBOG activists and participants 
at its events did not succeed. The interviewees, beyond specific actors openly identified as 
being in the strategic teams of #BBOG, did not respond to questionnaires sent by the research 
team. This low response rate can be attributed to an atmosphere of fear of state authorities who 
were ever present at #BBOG rallies and meetings and were perceived by participants and 
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activists to be watching the activities of the movement. Moreover, respondents did appear not to 
trust questionnaires sent by email or distributed in hard copies in spite of the research team’s 
repeated assurances of the anonymity of respondents. 
 
4.6 Key informant interviews  
Thirty-two key informant interviews were conducted with three groups of key informants directly 
involved or affected by the #BBOG movement between November 2017 and March 2018. These 
included 11 key informant interviews with leaders of the #BBOG, known as the Strategic Team; 
nine interviews in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State (Chibok is in Borno State);1 and 11 
interviews in Chibok with people including an abducted girl’s parent, abducted girls’ relatives and 
community leaders. 
 
The interviews provided an opportunity to get in-depth perspectives from the key stakeholders 
on the place of #BBOG and its role in empowerment and accountability processes. The 
interviews also allowed the research team to establish rapport/trust with community leaders who 
had not attended the initial research inception engagement meetings described above and to 
solidify the trust and rapport developed with the #BBOG leadership. In some cases, where 
conversations had started with the #BBOG leaders, these in-depth interviews were used to 
further seek clarity of ideas and information emanating from ongoing data analysis. Individual 
interviews with the community leaders in Maiduguri and with Chibok parents provided an 
opportunity to obtain insights on the reach and depth of the movement and its perceived 
contribution to empowerment and accountability at the local levels. 
 
Interviews were conducted in Hausa (the dominant language in the study area) or English 
depending on the interviewee’s preference, audio recorded and transcribed by the research 
team. The interviews were led by one of the core technical research team members with support 
from research assistants. Full consent and permission to record the interviews were obtained 
before the interviews were conducted following full disclosure from the researchers on the 
purpose and objectives of the study and how the data collected would be processed/stored and 
used. 
 
4.7 Data analysis  
The research adopted a flexible and evolving research process that allowed for continuous data 
gathering, analysis and revision. This reiterative process allowed for incremental data gathering 
as trust grew between the researchers and the researched. For instance, during the study 
period, the research team held two full day engagement meetings with key stakeholders 
including #BBOG leadership (the inception meeting described above and a feedback session 
following completion of data collection and preliminary analyses in June 2018). These 
engagement forums enabled a reflection process and trust building that also facilitated important 
stakeholder feedback thus enhancing the validity of the findings.  
 
In all of these, the researchers sought to understand the emergence and structure of the 
#BBOG, its operational strategies, challenges and impact regarding accountability and 
empowerment. These themes informed the creation of the codes, concepts and categories in 
research analyses supplemented by stakeholder feedback and other data sources described 
above.  
 
                                                        
1  Many of the people in the rural areas, including Chibok, had relocated to Maiduguri where the heavy military presence 
presents some measure of security. 
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5  The Bring Back Our Girls movement 
 
5.1 Emergence of the #BBOG 
The Bring Back Our Girls movement emerged from the context of a violent and extremist 
insurgency in North East Nigeria. The movement was a direct reaction to the failure of the 
Nigerian state to deliver on its duty of providing the safety and security of its citizens. It was also 
a response to the intensification of the conflicts by the insurrectionary group through its targeted 
attacks of schools and educational institutions in the conflict zones where they carried out 
atrocities such as killings, abductions, kidnappings and laying communities and settlements to 
waste. 
 
The abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok Secondary School on 14 April 2014 was the 
tipping point for the formation of the Bring Back Our Girls (#BBOG) movement. That sad event 
followed a series of violent attacks and the display of extreme ruthlessness by the Boko Haram 
terrorists. For instance, the group attacked a boys’ only school in Buni Yadi in February 2014 
killing 59 boarding schoolboys, abducted schoolgirls in Chibok in April and the following day, at 
the Nyaya motor park in Abuja, detonated an explosive device killing dozens of people. Each of 
these was followed by either silence or a lack of any decisive action from the then government. 
 
On 23 April 2014, at a World Book Capital conference in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, former World 
Bank Vice President and former Minister of Education in Nigeria, Dr Oby Ezekwesili spoke about 
the abducted schoolgirls followed by some comments from Professor Wole Soyinka. A lawyer, 
Ibrahim Abdullahi, tweeted Dr Ezekwesili’s words, #BringBackOurDaughters, and 
#BringBackOurGirls. By May 2014, Twitter analytics showed that over three million people had 
used the second hashtag. Despite the war in Syria, the missing Malaysian airline, the crisis in 
Ukraine, and other trending global issues, the #BringBackOurGirls spread to 69 countries and 
dwarfed many other global issues for a while (Ibeh 2014). 
 
Hadiza Bala Usman, an influential Nigerian political activist and women’s leader sent emails to 
individuals and civil society organisations to solicit a march in Abuja. On 30 April 2014, the Bring 
Back Our Girls (BBOG) movement appeared on the streets of Abuja and ended its march at the 
Unity Fountain. As the final speeches were being read, a man from Chibok, an abducted girl’s 
relative, knelt and begged the crowd: ‘don’t leave us; if you do, they (the government) will forget 
us’. On the spur of the moment, Dr Oby Ezekwesili announced: ‘we will stand with you until your 
kids come back!’. To date, the #BBOG has met every day at the Unity Fountain in Abuja. It has 
also staged some 250 protests within and outside Nigeria. This dramatic start to the movement 
captures some of the key foundational elements of this social and political action and factors that 
has contributed to its continued existence. These include: an ongoing violent conflict situation, 
an ineffective state response, immense outrage by citizens and others over an incident that 
involved the abduction of a large number of innocent young girls from a school, mobilisation of 
protest via social media and demonstrations. It also reflects social and political activists’ 
spontaneous response of to a seemingly helpless citizen and representative of an affected 
community’s appeal for help. The rest is about organisational design; generating and building 
consensus around operational and moral principles; and sustaining motivation, interest and 
resources for a campaign unique in Nigeria’s history. Additionally, both the leadership of the 
movement and the overwhelming international attention and response also mattered.  
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5.2 Structure of the #BBOG  
The movement initially organised itself around five parallel arms: Mobilisation Team; Media and 
Communication Team; Resource Team; Legal Team; and the Sit-Out Team, but these were later 
subsumed into a three-layer structure. A member of the strategic communication explained why 
the movement needed some form of structure; ‘…we are growing and we’ve stayed here for long 
[sic]; we needed some form of structure’. At the top is the Head of the movement, who is the 
head of the Strategic Team and spokesperson of the movement. At the centre is the Strategic 
Team which set goals and objectives, and planned activities and events. This is followed by the 
Sit-Out Team which is made up of all other members who observe the daily sit-outs at Unity 
Fountain in Abuja. The Strategic Team reports to the Sit-Out team; they are not to execute any 
programme unless approved by the Sit-Out team. The Strategic Communication Team is a 
strong subset of the Strategic Team, and consists of persons with expertise in media and 
communications, responsible for managing all media platforms, disseminating information and 
keeping members informed.  
 
Figure 5.1 BBOG organisational structure 
 
Source: Authors’ own, developed from interviews. 
 
The exact size of the BBOG membership remains unclear due to its free entry, free exit policy. 
The exact membership cannot be estimated as the movement’s presence is more amplified by 
the existence of a strong media team. This loose structure is deliberate and intentional and is a 
reflection of the new social movements’ phenomenon. Interviews with the leadership pointed to 
the existence of a list of members and their contacts but the overall external atmosphere of fear 
created by endless government surveillance and acrimonious relationships with the military and 
the state created a very cautious approach by the team which did not allow the sharing of any 
members’ list. As the movement grew and engaged in a range of activities, some structure 
emerged and most of the key actors remained in the movement over the past four years, 
maintaining strong links.  
 
5.3 Gendered nature of BBOG movement 
The gender composition of the BBOG marks it out as a unique group among social movements 
in Nigeria. The movement has continuously been led by women, alongside the active 
involvement of men. Men served as members of the strategic team and the head of strategic 
communication team is also male. Table 5.1 below shows the sex distribution of BBOG leaders 
to date.  
Strategic Team 
Head of the 
Movement/ 
Strategic Team
Sit-Out Team
Strategic 
Communication 
Team 
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Table 5.1 Sex of BBOG leaders 
Leadership 
sequence 
Head of 
Movement/ 
Strategic Team 
Sex Sit-Out Team Sex Media/communication Sex 
1st Dr Obi Ezekwesili F Hadiza Bala Usman F Olawole deputised by 
Tunji2 
M 
2nd Aisha Yusuf F Florence Ozo3 F Sesugh Akume M 
3rd  Florence Obi F Bukky Shonibare F Olufemi Olufade M 
4th  Edith Yasin F Aisha Yusuf F Jeff Okoroafor M 
5th  - - Abubakar Malunfashi M - - 
6th - - Gapani Yanga M - - 
Source: Authors’ own. Interviews with BBOG leadership. 
 
It is not clear what accounts for the female dominance in the leadership of the BBOG. It might be 
that women connected with the issues around the abduction of young schoolgirls more easily 
than men. There has also been speculation that the #BBOG created a space for the adoption of 
women’s issues around gender-based violence in conflict zones and making schools safe and 
secure for girls, issues that the state-captured, conventional dominant women’s organisations, 
were unwilling or unable to adopt. It has been argued that rather than open up the civic space 
for women’s activism, electoral politics through the women’s wings of the dominant political 
parties and the different variants of state feminism, constricted the space. The #BBOG 
movement represented an example of bubbling up, improvising and recovering the civic space 
for these kinds of issues. Another reason put forward for the strong presence of women leaders 
in the movement is that it may also have been that the strategy and policy of non-militancy was 
not attractive to many men who then had to leave after initially participating in the protests. Men 
in leadership would probably have altered somewhat the commitment to non-militancy and 
decorous confrontation that was one of the hall marks of the protests and activities of the 
#BBOG movement.  
 
The exit of some predominantly male early members could also be related to their perceptions or 
feelings around the strong personalities of pioneer female leaders of the movement and their 
speculation that the movement was contributing to the political profiles and prospects of some of 
the leaders.  Another important point to note about the initial leaders of the movement is that 
they were made up of women who were either professionals or had independent means as 
business persons. Some of them were also seasoned political activists with track records of 
activism and engagement in other social issues. These were therefore not disempowered 
women. Whatever the reason for the gendered nature of the movement’s leadership and 
posture, it is clear that in a society as patriarchal as the Nigerian society, significant underlying 
gender dynamics were present both within the movement and the way it was perceived by those 
outside it. It is also notable that although there are more men than women in the media team, IT 
and journalism skills seemed to have been given ascendancy in the selection of these team 
members. The two women in the media team as at the time of this study were journalists, and 
the men were information technology professionals. This profile of the members of the media 
team may have contributed to the success of the #BBOG in the use of social media. 
 
                                                        
2  The Media and Communication Team also consisted of two female journalists. 
3  Florence Ozor and Bukky Shonibare led the sit-out team in brief quick successions. 
 24 
The #BBOG composition and leadership is gendered in a functional way. If there was a quest for 
gender balance, it was not an open quest and it was not fulfilled at the expense of quality of 
contribution and engagement along with the need to populate the teams with those whose skills 
and professional experiences were requisite to the successful functioning of their specific teams. 
Another interesting element of the gender dimensions in the movement was the distance of 
other women’s groups from the movement. This might be because participation in the #BBOG 
was individual and women activists engaged and participated as individuals not as members or 
representatives of women and feminist groups. Another possible reason for the silence of other 
women’s groups might be related to the state capture of the conventional women’s groups 
whose activities were now predominantly channelled through the dominant political parties or 
other state-dominated or sponsored outlets. 
 
 
6  Operational strategies of the BBOG movement 
The #BBOG movement like many social movements around the world was birthed as a reaction 
to a key social and political issue, in this case the kidnap of 276 schoolgirls from government 
secondary school Chibok, in Borno State. The movement held its first public protest on 30 April 
2014, which was meant to be a one-off event. Neither the participants nor the observers could 
have thought that four years later, BBOG would still be staging sit-outs daily, organising protests 
sporadically, and mounting online pressure consistently.  
 
There were reasons to expect the BBOG movement to be short-lived. Chief among these is the 
context in which it exists. The Nigerian context is a fragile, conflict- and violence-affected one. 
The Boko Haram insurgency in the North East was making terrifying and daring incursions 
southwards with the bombing of places in Abuja such as the UN House and the Nyanya Motor 
Park – the latter being bombed a few weeks before the first BBOG protest. The national and 
state security systems were overstretched. Mounting a visible and enduring social and political 
action, led by identifiable actors was therefore dangerous; a flash mob approach would have 
been safer. 
 
Second, the Nigerian economy was going through difficulties and incidents of poverty were on 
the rise. For the citizens who were contending with the pressures of daily survival and 
uncertainties, participating in prolonged protests for a social cause was not a primary concern. 
Mobilising such citizens can be a hard task. 
 
Another reason to expect the BBOG movement to be a flash in the pan is that its focus was not 
a recurrent issue but a specific one-off incident: pressure the government to rescue the 
abducted schoolgirls and bring them back alive and safe. Diarised issues, such as climate 
change, press freedom and the like, have days in a year earmarked for them drawing interested 
actors globally. The longevity of social and political actions around such issues is more certain 
than around specific one-off issues such as the abduction of a group of schoolgirls in an obscure 
rural part of North East Nigeria.  
 
Fourth, the BBOG is women-led. Although there is a long history of women-led social and 
political actions in Nigeria, it is difficult to ignore the history of attrition of such movements in a 
predominantly patriarchal Nigeria. While women have led a number of historical protests such as 
the Egba women’s riots of 1947 (see Byfield 2003) or the Aba women’s riots of 1929 (see Afigbo 
1966) among many others, these seem to have been short-lived. None had certainly lasted for 
four years, but were nonetheless reactive, sharply focused and characterised by ‘purposive 
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commitment’ (Taylor 1989: 765). Another important difference with the iconic women protests is 
that there was no way the #BBOG phenomenon could be described as a riot or any form of an 
unruly protest. Its presence on the streets and in public was always disciplined, peaceful and 
orderly. The founders and leaders insisted on this position. 
 
Moreover, there is the presence of a group of vociferous defenders of government online and 
offline. Right from its inception, the #BBOG has had to contend with an army of those defending 
the government and attacking #BBOG activists more often in online forums but also offline 
during protests. In spite of these difficulties, the #BBOG trudged on using a diversity of methods 
and means to press their demand, that is, ‘bring back the abducted schoolgirls alive’. The 
reasons for this resilience and durability can be traced to strong alliances formed by #BBOG 
activists and participants thus creating both a virtual and actual community of activists along with 
the operational strategies of the #BBOG movement. 
 
6.1 The unique nature of the cause: the abduction of the Chibok girls 
The #BBOG movement emerged in response to an incident unique in the history of popular 
protests in Nigeria and at an important moment in global politics and advocacy. Previous protest 
issues in Nigeria have not received the kind of attention that the abduction of the Chibok girls 
received – apart from the international support for the victims of the Biafran war based on the 
spread of horrific images of starving children. During an era with a backdrop of seemingly 
endless conflicts of violent extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and the ISIL militants victimising 
women and abducting them to be used as weapons, the incident with the Chibok girls drew 
global attention. It fitted the pattern of gender-based violence in conflict situations in Africa and 
beyond. There had been several cases of kidnappings and abductions along with rape, forced 
marriages and conscriptions as child soldiers in the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Eastern 
Congo, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, Somalia, Syria and Afghanistan. This 
unfortunate trend has provoked strong international reactions among advocacy groups on 
gender-based violence and the exploitation of children and girls in conflict situations. These 
advocacy groups were strong external and internal voices along with #BBOG over the case of 
the Chibok girls. Also the Chibok girls were symbols that signified different meanings to different 
stakeholders (Matfess 2017). They were daughters and girls, Christian girls, young schoolgirls 
and the abduction fuelled different reactions from strong Muslim believers who felt the 
abductions have no place in Islam, to fundamentalist political Christian groups who saw this as a 
justification for their Islamophobia. The Boko Haram also dramatised the event by posting videos 
twice in May 2014 with all kinds of claims and threats to sell the girls, marry them off and/or 
forcibly convert them to Islam. 
 
There was also the fact that all the abducted girls were Christian girls from the Christian enclave 
of Chibok in the predominantly Muslim population of North Eastern Nigeria. Christian groups 
outside of Nigeria, particularly US evangelicals used this situation to further their campaign on 
the issue of the persecution and discrimination against Christians around the world. However, 
the #BBOG remained a non-faith based movement. Its activists come from across all faiths and 
there were efforts to sustain an inter faith posture through the composition of the leadership that 
included both Christians and Muslims. In the context of Nigerian politics, the abducted girls also 
became pawns in high stakes political disputations, bargains, electoral campaigns and 
negotiations. 
 
The very nature of the Boko Haram insurgency, its connections to international terrorist groups, 
its unorthodox methods of self-publicity and fear-provoking videos and media releases made this 
phenomenon an incredibly newsworthy material for the international media. There was coverage 
 26 
on CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Reuters and a large number of global and international media 
networks. The inept handling of the incident and the overall conflict in the North East of Nigeria 
by the then government of President Goodluck Jonathan also did not help matters much. The 
denials, aggressive behaviour by government officials and the growing toll of casualties and 
human rights abuse in the conflict zone all became issues that rights advocacy groups 
campaigned against. In short the #BBOG movement was campaigning for an issue that all the 
context and the circumstances around it managed to place in endless public limelight. 
 
6.2 Elastic circle of concern 
Although the clear aim of the #BBOG movement was to pressure the government to confront 
Boko Haram and bring the abducted Chibok girls back home safely, it kept redefining and 
extending what this really means. When some women were abducted in Bassa, the #BBOG 
printed their photos on large placards and staged a protest – bring back our girls and the 
women. When lecturers of the University of Maiduguri (UNIMAID) were abducted while on 
fieldwork, the #BBOG staged a protest: bring back our girls and the UNIMAID lecturers. When 
Boko Haram allegedly killed a large number of soldiers, #BBOG staged a march, bring back our 
girls and don’t bury our soldiers secretly in mass graves. The Movement then extended its 
concern to include demands for good governance, school safety, welfare of IDPs and soldiers’ 
welfare. They even visited the dreaded Sambisa forest4 to interact with and encourage the 
soldiers. What must be remembered though is that most or all of their other adopted issues were 
related to the violent conflicts in North Eastern Nigeria, the abductions and kidnappings of 
helpless children and citizens and the escalation of gender-based violence in the conflict zones. 
 
In Nigeria and indeed in most fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings, most of those who 
protest about a social and political issue are those who have personal stakes: an abducted 
person’s relative, owner of a threatened roadside business, residents of a neighbourhood 
marked for demolition among others. An abstract or political commitment to larger social causes 
is expressed mainly by a small number of activists found in the civil society, activists among the 
human rights community or university students. The #BBOG generated support and interest 
beyond the usual activist circles and included civil servants, office workers, business people and 
traders, many of whom participated in their sit-outs, protest marches and demonstrations 
whenever they could. It did this by keeping the cause alive in the media and the physical daily 
presence of protesters in Abuja. By constantly redefining the circumference of their focus, 
#BBOG movement increased the number of those who had personal stakes and, therefore, 
would willingly join marches or protests. Yet, by keeping the Chibok girl’s abduction at the centre 
of their discourse, while weaving other contiguous issues around it, and around good 
governance, #BBOG movement demonstrated a single-mindedness and doggedness that 
endeared them to both local and foreign supporters. 
 
6.3 A disciplined posture, beliefs and cohesive tactics 
The BBOG aimed to stay above potentially distracting engagements such as national, state or 
local partisan politics, or controversies that could arise over the management of funders’ 
contributions. First, it declared a principle of funding purity: they were never to receive money 
from politicians or even external actors. Survival was to be based on members’ donations – cash 
                                                        
4  Sambisa Forest is located in Borno State in northeast Nigeria. Covering about 518 km² of landscape on a flatland and 
drained by the Ngadda and Yedseram Rivers. The British colonial administration had gazetted the Sambisa Forest as a 
reserve in 1958, making it one of the conservation legacies bequeathed to the Nigerian state by the colonial power. In 1977, 
the area was re-gazetted as a National Game Reserve for the preservation of rare animals and also as a way of generating 
funds from tourism. The forest has since become synonymous with Boko Haram terrorism. Boko Haram has waged a bloody 
war against the Nigerian state in a bid to foist its own brand of religious order on the secular state. 
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or kind. One of the founders and leaders of the movement stated that they refused money 
offered by the Borno State government. She emphasised that: 
 
Most of what we do that involves money comes voluntarily including media publications 
and coverage... so people come in to contribute according to their capacity, like t-shirt[s] 
and the wristband[s] were printed long ago in accordance to our individual financial 
capacities. We met participants at marches who had trekked long distances because they 
could not afford transport fares. We also observed members who had brought water and 
biscuits in their cars to share with other members... (Interviewee 001) 
 
When asked about financial assistance received from foreign governments and Nigerians in 
Diaspora, #BBOG activists said that monetary offers from foreign governments were turned 
down. However, the government of Argentina had awarded the #BringBackOurGirls movement 
the International Human Rights Prize Emilio F. Mignone for work in advocacy towards respect 
for human rights worldwide. The award came with a cash prize and the movement received it 
and committed it wholly to the education and welfare of released abducted girls. A bank account 
was opened for it. It was not, in their reckoning, meant for the #BBOG and could not be used by 
the group. The principle of refusing any sort of external donations was meant to protect the 
movement from: (a) alignment with the agendas of funders whether they are foreign donors, 
government or private wealthy individuals who are not active in the movement; (b) insulate the 
movement from the common wrangles that often surround the management of donated funds in 
Nigeria; and (c) to avoid perceptions or/and accusations of the movement having been captured 
by a funder’s agenda or interests. 
 
Second, the #BBOG movement declared a principle of total distance from partisan politics. At its 
inception, critics of the #BBOG accused it of working for the opposition party. This was 
understandably due to the fact that many of the politicians in opposition at that time spoke in 
favour of the movement. Even when the ruling party lost re-election, those who were hitherto in 
opposition and were friends of the #BBOG soon became estranged to the movement. The 
reason for total abstinence from partisan politics was to preserve the claim to neutrality. As a 
result of this commitment, each member of the #BBOG that had accepted political appointments 
or had decided to go into partisan politics had to relinquish their leadership role in the #BBOG 
movement. These included the most prominent member of the group, Dr Oby Ezekwesili, who 
decided to contest for the presidency of Nigeria, and Hajia Adiza Bala Usman who was once 
among the leading members of the #BBOG. When Dr Ezekwesili decided to contest for the 
presidency, the leaders of the #BBOG who chose to support her in her campaigns had to 
relinquish their leadership role in the movement. Further, during the last quarter of 2018, four 
other members of the strategic team also resigned to enable them support fully the political 
candidature of Dr Oby Ezekwesili. 
 
Third, the #BBOG adopted a number of tactics that helped build internal cohesion among 
activists and participants at its protests. It codified its aims, objectives and guiding principles into 
an acronym and a chant that not only guided the members but also united them and fired their 
zeal at meetings. The guiding principles were summed up in the expression: HUMANITEEDS 
(Hope, Unity, Motivation, Affability, Nationalism, Integrity, Transparency, Empathy, Equity, 
Discipline, and Sacrifice). The movement also composed a responsorial chant which they recited 
many times during meetings or marches (see the Annexe for the BBOG mobilisation chant). The 
chant performed the dual role of putting the demands of the movement on the foreground and, 
being a chant, energising members during protests. Tokens of membership such as red-colour 
clothing by members during meetings, red branded t-shirts, and branded wristbands also served 
cohesive purposes. 
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Closely connected to HUMANITEEDS, especially affability and discipline, is the principle of non-
militancy. Members were not allowed to insult anyone verbally or attack anyone physically. 
Blocking of the road during marches, the throwing of stones and forcing vehicles to display 
green leaves as sign of solidarity are common practices of marchers in Nigeria. However, these 
were not permitted in #BBOG events and protests. The movement therefore imposed a 
discipline that limited the chances of her being associated with riots and unruly politics. The 
immediate impact of this approach might be respect earned from non-members and government 
officials. A much more important impact is that non-militancy and overt non-violent actions make 
high-handed response or use of force by the police unnecessary. This explains the rarity of 
injury among members during marches. Although their politics was oppositional and demand-
making, it exercised scarcely any features of what is known in the literature as unruly politics 
(see Khanna et al. 2013; Hossain et al. 2018). 
 
6.4 Multiple tools; multiple channels 
The #BBOG movement was unique for its use of social media. Its Twitter handle and Facebook 
accounts had thousands of followers, likers and unlikers. However, the movement combines that 
with physical and visible presence especially in Abuja and Lagos. It deployed multiple channels 
(see Figure 6.1): mass media press releases, street protests, documentation projects and others 
in an attempt to make its voice heard by policy makers. In the process, these tools also ensured 
that it reached its members. 
 
Figure 6.1 BBOG methods 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
If the movement had adopted only one of these two broad groups of channels, it would have 
been unable to reach as many followers it reached. Adopting multiple channels also meant that 
members had the freedom to choose which channel worked for them the best, and that 
information from a channel got reinforced by information from other channels. 
 
6.5 A tactic for a quick outcome but a plan for the long haul 
The #BBOG was intended to be a one day project or at most a project lasting for a few days. It 
was believed that a loud outcry would snap the government into action and lead to eventual 
procurement of the release of the schoolgirls. It would also further halt or significantly reduce the 
violence in the Northeast. Yet, even right from the start, the leaders had set a tough objective for 
themselves: continue the advocacy until the last of the abducted schoolgirls gets back home 
safe and alive. While they wished that this would happen soon, they were prepared for the long 
haul just in case the objective was not quickly achieved. Regular meetings, regular marches and 
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a consistent engagement with government are all part of the tactics for the long haul. The 
foregoing strategies appeared to be responsible for the resilience and durability of the BBOG. 
What follows is the impact of the activities of the group. 
 
6.6 BBOG’s partnerships and collaborations  
Across Nigeria, the #BBOG movement gained sympathy and membership due to long term 
neglect of important social and political issues by government. With the group’s operational 
strategy of non-violent and persistent demands through peaceful protest, intelligence5 and 
coordination, many government, local and international organisations and individuals have 
sought partnership with #BBOG to carry out one activity or the other. The #BBOG movement on 
its part had called on the international community and well-meaning individuals to seek support 
and public visibility for the Chibok girls.  
 
Beyond protests, rallies and campaigns in the media and social media, #BBOG worked with 
interested public, private and civil society institutions on activities and projects that addressed 
some of the problems of management of the abducted persons. They worked on the creation of 
a national missing persons’ register to support data and record keeping of persons missing in 
disasters and conflicts. They also campaigned against corruption which was a major factor that 
contributed to government effectiveness across the board and they helped provide relief and 
support for internally displaced persons that were victims of many of Nigeria’s conflicts and 
violence. As part of their connections with the abducted girls, they helped to raise funds for 
scholarships for those freed and returned. The activities carried out by #BBOG in partnership 
with other groups, supports the assertion that social movements have the capacity to bring 
about change and transformation. Table 6.1 below presents some of activities done through 
partnership. 
 
Table 6.1 Selected #BBOG partnerships  
BBOG  Organisation/individual/groups Activity 
1 Human Rights Commission National Missing Persons Register 
2 National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)  Emergency Management (Internally Displaced 
Persons) 
3 Ministry of Women Affairs Chibok Desk 
4 Nigerian Air Force Air Surveillance of Sambisa Forest 
5 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission March Against Corruption 
6 New York City Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney Holding rallies on Capitol Hill, Issuing Press 
Releases,  
7 Planned Parenthood Federation Nigeria (PPFN), 
Foundation for Refugee Economic Empowerment 
(FREE), Victims of Violence, CyberLogik Foundation 
Provided specific relief items to pregnant 
women, babies and general basic necessities 
to men and young people in IDPs 
8 CyberLogik Foundation Scholarships for school children 
Source: Authors’ own. Interview data. 
 
 
                                                        
5  BBOG developed a Verification, Authentication, Reunification System (VARS) and gave it to the government to use in 
verifying the identity of missing persons. 
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7  Impact of the #BBOG: Empowerment and 
accountability? 
Of the 276 girls that were abducted in 2014, 107 have been rescued or released. The #BBOG 
leadership attributes the release of these girls to its relentless advocacy, noting that this forced 
the government to secure the release or effect the rescue of these girls. As one of the leaders 
noted: ‘we succeeded in securing the release of 113 girls… the fact is [if] BBOG never existed, 
these guys may not have been rescued’ (Interviewee 001). 
 
The government has not denied that the #BBOG pressure was a factor in its effort to rescue the 
girls. In addition to this important achievement, the movement has had impact in three major 
ways: keeping the issue alive nationally and globally; exacting responses from government; and 
emboldening or equipping social and political actors. 
 
7.1 Keeping the plight of the girls in relentless global and national limelight 
One of the major successes of the #BBOG movement cited by the majority of interviewees is the 
ability to keep the plight of the abducted girls in the limelight, both in Nigeria and internationally 
for over four years.  The movement has done this by sustaining the conversation about the 
missing girls through a combination of tactics including social media activism, protests, rallies 
and daily sit outs at the Unity Fountain (Abuja). As a consequence, the movement has attracted 
many other people who joined in putting pressure on the government to secure the release of 
the girls. The following comment from one of the leading lights of the movement is illustrative:  
 
More and more Nigerians are now adding their voices to the call for the return of the 
Chibok girls, since BBOG is not relenting [n]or giving up, it has moved a lot of people to 
joining the call on government to act for the release of the girls. (Interviewee 002) 
 
The effectiveness of each of the #BBOG’s tactics in achieving impact by keeping the abduction 
in the limelight differ. Of interest is the use of online platforms to sustain action. Our media 
tracking showed that whereas the #BBOG media platforms set the pace for online discussion of 
the Chibok abduction in 2014 and 2015, by May 2018, the most influential posts were from 
groups other than the #BBOG. In fact, 60.6 per cent of posts on the abduction were from people 
and groups outside the #BBOG. As shown in Table 7.1, only three out of the ten most popular 
posts originated from the #BBOG movement. The remaining seven posts were shared by the 
#BBOG movement on its Facebook page. Two of the shared posts originated from Nigerian 
media houses with strong international online reach – Sahara Reporters and Premium Times. 
Five were stories originally published by foreign media – BBC, New York Times, and VOA. The 
focus of all ten posts is consistent with the objective of the group. 
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Table 7.1 Interaction statistics of posts on #BBOG_Nigeria Facebook page 
Primary 
source 
Focus Date Likes Comments Share Total 
BBOG Thoughts about mothers of #ChibokGirls on 
Mothers’ Day 
13/05/18 528 16 147 691 
Sahara 
Reporters 
Boko Haram Returns Kidnapped School Girls 
in Dapchi, Five Dead 
21/03/18 378 15 90 483 
New York 
Times 
Kidnapped as schoolgirls by Boko Haram 11/04/18 216 9 87 312 
BBC Many #ChibokGirls are dead 15/04/18 227 2 75 304 
BBC News On claims that many Chibok girls are dead 15/04/18 227 2 75 304 
VOA Nigeria’s Dapchi Girls Go Back to School 21/05/18 229 3 58 290 
Premium 
Times 
How 14-year-old girl helped Chibok girl 
escape Boko Haram 
13/01/18 234 6 39 279 
New York 
Times 
Interviews with rescued Chibok girls 15/04/18 150 15 70 235 
BBOG Police harassment 24/04/18 142 15 45 202 
BBOG 4th year commemoration in New York 09/04/18 130 5 56 191 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
The statistics from Twitter is even more instructive. Table 7.2 shows that the tweets with the 
highest interaction statistics was not from the BBOG but from CNN. 
 
Table 7.2 Interaction statistics of Tweets on @BBOG_Nigeria Twitter timeline 
Primary source Focus Date Comment
s 
Retweets Likes Total 
CNN International Leah Sharibu’s refusal to convert 
to Islam 
15/05/18 42 662 428 1,132 
BBOG_Nigeria Leah Sharibu’s birthday 13/05/18 92 421 399 912 
Florence Ozor™ Leah Sharibu’s birthday 13/05/18 31 184 264 479 
Ms Maureen Kabrik Leah Sharibu’s birthday 12/05/18 14 233 216 463 
Ahmad Salkida Proof of life of Chibok girls in 
captivity 
13/05/18 12 205 149 366 
Rep Frederica Wilson Message of hope on Leah Sharibu 19/05/18 12 98 246 356 
Bukky Shonibare Leah Sharibu’s birthday 14/05/18 6 222 123 351 
Premium Times Leah Sharibu’s birthday 14/05/18 20 195 130 345 
Aisha Yesufu No one contacts Leah Sharibu’s 
family 
07/05/18 18 147 163 328 
Rep Frederica Wilson Fear still grips Dapchi Girls’ 
School in Nigeria 
21/05/18 13 81 178 272 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Two tweets by Rep Frederica Wilson, a member of the United States House of Representatives, 
also feature in the top ten. Even though only one tweet with high level of reactions originated 
from @BBOG_Nigeria, four other tweets originated from members of #BBOG – Florence Ozor, 
Ms Maureen Kabrik, Bukky Shonibare, and Aisha Yesufu. Thus, 50 per cent of the tweets 
originated from the #BBOG group. Of the remaining two tweets, one originated from the 
foremost Nigerian journalist on reporting Boko Haram related issues, Ahmad Salkida, and one 
from a national online news channel, Premium Times. All ten tweets are consistent with the 
focus of #BBOG advocacy.  
 
This internationalisation of the Chibok abductions illustrates how an otherwise national issue can 
attract international attention if properly fuelled by social and political actions along with strong 
international support. It also shows that the initial issue advocates can attract followers whose 
energy and consistency will sooner or later overtake those of the initial advocates, thus giving 
the social and political action a life of its on. It further illustrates the success of the #BBOG is 
priming the abduction issue to a point that the issue took on a life of its own almost independent 
of the #BBOG movement. 
 
Interviews with the #BBOG activists show a link between the plight of the abducted girls and the 
significant attention to this issue paid by major global political actors such as the United Nations; 
the European Union; the United States Embassy in Nigeria; the British High Commission in 
Nigeria; the German and Italian governments; and some other European countries. 
Representatives of these countries actively participated in online advocacy in support of efforts 
to rescue the abducted girls. Some individuals such as Congresswoman Theresa Wilson of the 
United States advocated support within the American parliament towards the rescue and return 
of the girls. Michelle Obama, Malala Yousafzai and others are among global figures that 
tweeted, spoke and held signs in support of the BBOG movement and its course (Matfess 2017).  
 
Some members of the BBOG leadership team suggested that some financial and military aid 
that came to the Nigerian government in the effort to end insurgency in the North East was given 
in response to #BBOG-led advocacy about the missing Chibok girls. Thus, #BBOG’s advocacy 
had the dual effect of not only bringing the plight of the missing girls to national and global 
attention, but also spotlighting the general condition and the atrocities of the embattled North 
Eastern region.  
 
A member of the BBOG strategic team added:  
 
… the support that the Nigerian government is getting stems from the campaign as the 
international community’s now realised the need to support Nigeria to end the 
insurgency… the situation in the North East was not being reported but we brought light 
into the real situation in the North East to the whole world… (Interviewee 003) 
 
The impact of globally and nationally priming the abduction issue can be appreciated from two 
angles. First, is that it most likely pushed government to take action. By creating a national and 
international public relations discomfort for the government, the #BBOG pressured the 
government to a point where it had to act. The government of President Goodluck Jonathan was 
generally considered as inept, unwilling and slow to respond to the abduction issue. Mired in 
corruption allegations and globally perceived as insufficiently proactive on many issues, the 
government needed to respond to this international public relations embarrassment in order to 
redeem its image. Some of the actions taken by the government as a result of the strong push 
by #BBOG included: setting up a probe panel, goading the military towards being more active in 
the North East, and sending a government delegation to Chibok Secondary School for on-the-
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spot assessment. President Jonathan also attempted to visit the North East but was prevented 
by the security chiefs. The electoral victory of President Muhammadu Buhari was in good part 
the result of his promise to end the insurgency in the North East by leading the military from the 
front. It was only logical for him to attempt to do this and in that way, acceded to the demands of 
the #BBOG movement. 
 
The second indication that the national and global priming of the Chibok abduction was not 
without impact becomes obvious when the aftermath of the Chibok abduction is compared with 
the aftermaths of other abductions and attacks. The murder of scores of schoolboys in the town 
of Buni Yadi, the abduction of several hundred women in different villages in Borno, Adamawa 
and Yobe States, the bombing in Nyaya, Abuja, the attack of the UN House in Abuja among 
numerous others at best attracted condemnation from government and a promise to bring the 
perpetrators to book. None attracted the kind of response that the Chibok abduction attracted. 
We will consider this point further in the following section.  
 
7.2 Exacting responses from government 
It is important to note that on the average, there are about 100 protests and marches in Nigeria 
every year, most of which happen in Abuja and around the premises of the National Assembly. 
However, only few of these get the attention of government. The #BBOG action not only got the 
attention of government but also exacted a response from government. Below we highlight 
instances where the movement was able to hold the government accountable for its actions 
towards rescuing the abducted girls.   
 
First is the verbal response. From time to time, the #BBOG made claims and accusations, and 
government responded often with rebuttals. On the other hand, when government made claims, 
#BBOG refuted it with evidence, which would then force the government to retract.  
 
One of the interviewees, a member of the BBOG Strategic Team said,  
 
Any time we come out to protest, the government will come out to speak... Okay, for 
example, look at our last outing; it is because of it they went to Chibok. They went and 
held a meeting with parents who their children are still in the forest. (Interviewee 010) 
 
She claimed that even if it was to publish false information, (including claims that the girls had 
been rescued), the government often responded to claims and allegations made by the #BBOG.  
In some instances, the government would release information about the welfare and status of 
the girls following a push from the #BBOG, while in others, there would be exchanges of letters 
between the government and #BBOG regarding the latter’s request to visit the North East for 
inspection. This was so that the #BBOG could verify claims that the government was making 
progress in the war  against the Boko Haram insurgents (Independent 2017).  
 
However, verbal responses from government were not always pleasant. For instance, the 
Director of Defence Information, Major-General Chris Olukolade, in a lengthy article accused the 
#BBOG of sabotaging the efforts of the military, and alerted them to the presence of an 
individual among them who was determined, for personal reasons, to tarnish his (Olukolade’s) 
image and ruin his career (Olukolade 2015). Many instances of these unpleasant verbal 
exchanges abound. The important point, however, is that government did in fact respond in an 
attempt to be answerable for its actions and that this response was elicited by women-led social 
and political actions in a largely patriarchal society.  
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The second kind of response exacted from government was practical action. In response to 
pressure from the #BBOG, the government created a desk at the Ministry of Women Affairs for 
the Chibok girls, known as the Chibok Desk. The role of the Desk was to source for, and make 
available to the public, information about Chibok and the abducted girls. The #BBOG was invited 
to join this Desk by the Vice-President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, but they refused, claiming that 
such partnership with government could be damaging to their public image. 
 
Thirdly and lastly, President Muhammadu Buhari agreed to meet parents of the abducted girls 
from Chibok. Although the event ended on a sad note with the President declaring that he did 
not know where the abducted girls were, and walking out on the parents and members of the 
#BBOG, it was significant. Only consistent and biting advocacy can draw out a Nigerian 
president to meet with protesters or victims at their instance. The normal practice is to send an 
official to speak on behalf of government. 
 
7.3 Raising social and political actors 
The #BBOG movement went beyond online activism and street protests and sit-outs and began 
to train its members on life skills such as public speaking, public conduct, management and 
basic economics. Importantly, activists of the movement described instances where they felt 
empowered and gained their voice to speak out on issues that challenge power. A strategic 
team member, noted, ‘BBOG is a school, personally, for someone like me, I never knew I had a 
voice. I actually found my voice here, I found my voice at the fountain’ (Interviewee 004). She 
also noted that BBOG meetings had been educational for members as they learn more about 
governance, public policy, economy and management.  
 
As a result of this, some activists have left the #BBOG to set up non-governmental and welfare 
organisations and advocacy groups of their own. Some of these are operational in the embattled 
North Eastern part of the country. One example of such spill over group that was mentioned is 
the Mind Project. In this way, the #BBOG movement serves as a training ground for individuals 
who are interested in going further into welfare work and advocacy. 
 
7.4 Providing a space for the hurt 
Connected to raising and strengthening current and future activists, is also the fact that the 
#BBOG movement had become a space where those who are hurting could go to obtain 
information or just vent their pain and anger. The protests and rallies of the group appear to 
have become a platform for the families of other abducted persons to speak out about the plight 
of their loved ones and demand urgent action from the government. At one of the protests, a 
representative of the families of the University of Maiduguri lecturers that were abducted was 
observed as having an opportunity to speak up. He was able to share the grief of the affected 
families at the loss of their sons and to exhort the government not to relent in their efforts to 
retrieve the missing lecturers. A mother of one of the missing Lassa women in the Middle Belt 
was also at the protest and was given the platform to speak about the sufferings that the families 
of the abducted have experienced since the women were taken. Families of the abducted 
persons were also able to find comfort in the knowledge that someone was speaking up for their 
missing family members. Speaking about this, Aisha Yesufu referenced the mother of one of the 
University of Maiduguri lecturers who came to the group desolate, but was encouraged after 
finding hope in the idea that she was not alone in carrying the burden of the loss.  
 
However, while the #BBOG movement has branches in Abuja, Lagos and other places outside 
the country, some members of the Chibok community from which the girls were abducted, claim 
ignorance of their activities. The leader of an organisation for the mothers of the kidnapped girls 
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explained that they have only had one instance of contact with the #BBOG. Before any of the 
girls were rescued, they were invited to meet at Abuja.  
 
We had to sell our farm produce to go to Abuja to meet with them. I know as at then, they 
paid our hotel bills. Then they gave us food stuffs like Semovita and gave us soup 
ingredients to cook for ourselves. (Interviewee 001-Chibok) 
 
The impact of the #BBOG gains clarity when the events following the Chibok abduction are 
compared with the silence that followed similar abductions or attacks. Abduction of women and 
children is a major tactic of the Boko Haram. In 2018, UNICEF estimated that Boko Haram had 
kidnapped over 1,000 children, and killed more than 2,000 teachers (Busari 2018). Women were 
abducted in Gwoza, Bama and in other places. Schoolboys numbering about 60 (some say 29) 
were killed in Buni Yadi (Yusuff 2018). Amnesty International estimated that in 2014, over 2,000 
women and girls were abducted. These abductions were usually followed by government’s 
promise of immediate action and then silence. Sad as all these were, the government did not 
pick out any set of abductions for special intervention – such as erecting a garrison or embarking 
on special rescue or negotiation – as they did with the Chibok case. The only difference between 
these other cases and Chibok was the involvement of the #BBOG and the tremendous 
internationalisation of the issue. One could therefore infer that but for the #BBOG, the Chibok 
case would not have received special interventions and would have been forgotten like the 
others. 
 
 
8  Challenges the #BBOG faced 
The BBOG experienced a number of challenges. We discuss these in two categories: external 
and internal challenges. 
 
8.1 External challenges 
A good part of the external difficulties faced by the #BBOG could be linked to the activities of a 
number of counter-movements created to oppose or neutralise its efforts such as the Return Our 
Girls Movement rally which insisted that the heat of social and political action should be directed 
at the insurgents rather than at the government. The Return Our Girls Movement which was 
populated by the supporters of the then President, Mr Goodluck Jonathan, regarded the #BBOG 
movement as anti-government tools in the hands of opposition politicians and devoted its energy 
to subverting the activities of the #BBOG (Mills 2015). 
 
The Buhari Administration, which succeeded the Jonathan administration, has its own army of 
loyalists that respond online especially (but also offline) to every criticism of the government.  An 
example is the ‘WithBuhariwestand’ movement which described the #BBOG as ‘socio-advocacy 
terrorists’ and accused them of ‘politicising the rescue of the girls… [and] distracting the 
government and the Army’ (The Whistler 2017: np). Another group is the Global Excellence 
Foundation which was rather unsparing in condemning the #BBOG for asking that the president 
resign if he would not bring back the abducted schoolgirls as he promised during his campaign 
for office (Adaoyichie 2016). The outcomes of the activities of these countermovement and 
loyalists were diverse and negative. 
 
Physical harassment from government security agencies and hired thugs and members of the 
countermovement constituted another instance of external challenges. During a march on 28 
March 2014, the #BBOG activists were attacked and beaten up, and their cameras were broken. 
 36 
Some activists and participants sustained minor injuries in the attack and one member got his 
arm broken. Participants and activists noted that all this happened in the presence of policemen 
who did nothing to protect the #BBOG members. 
 
There were also physical encounters with security officials. The #BBOG was at times prevented 
from holding rallies or from marching in particular directions such as the Presidential Villa. This 
often involved pushes and shoves from hired thugs and security agents. On a number of 
occasions, some of the leaders of the #BBOG movement were arrested and detained.  
 
After disrupting one of such protest marches in August 2016, the Inspector General of Police 
stated that: 
 
The BringBackOurGirls group in Abuja, the nation’s capital recently, is becoming 
worrisome and a threat to public peace and order… and must not trample on other 
peoples’ rights through over-dramatisation of emotions, self-serving propaganda and 
disrespect of public (office) holders (Bada 2016).  
 
Government’s silence and refusal to give information also wearied the enthusiasm of the 
members. A three day march that we observed drew no response from the government. And 
persistent request for information from Chibok also met with helplessness on the part of the 
#BBOG activists. This altogether created a feeling of despair and fatigue among members. Even 
at the Chibok desk at the Ministry for Women affairs, the officials in charge claimed that they had 
no information. The same applies to some of the other causes that the #BBOG movement had 
taken on, such as the missing Rann women, the abducted University of Maiduguri lecturers and 
the missing Lassa women. Until the #BBOG in collaboration with the National Human Rights 
Commission, created a missing persons’ database, there had been no comprehensive record of 
missing and abducted people. 
 
Another instance of externally induced challenges was severe online attacks on the movement, 
especially on Twitter and Facebook. Most online critics of the movement accused them of being 
used by politicians in opposition, and of exploiting the Chibok abduction for personal political and 
financial gains. Aimu Foni, a member of the Maiduguri house of assembly expressed a similar 
sentiment during his interview, amidst claims that he has attended #BBOG meetings more than 
two times, he stated, ‘they have changed totally; they have become money conscious and 
politically-minded people’ (interviewee 006). 
 
Pressure and misgivings from the parents of the abducted girls was also a problem that the 
movement encountered. A member of the strategic team explained that some parents of the 
abducted girls who had not yet been rescued felt that the #BBOG’s engagement with the 
government was confrontational and antagonistic and was contributing to the delay in the rescue 
of the girls. Some others believed that the continued spotlight on the missing girls made them 
(the girls) invaluable to Boko Haram. He stated: 
 
The parents are grateful, but those that their kids are not yet back, feel that we are not 
engaging more with the government. So they believe we should change strategy by being 
friendly with the government instead of the normal/usual animosity. They believe we have 
paid so much attention to the children – that is why Boko Haram groups are still holding on 
to them. (Interviewee 006) 
 
The movement appeared to have a fractured relationship with the parents of the missing girls 
and the rest of the Chibok community. Mallam Yakubu Kikeyi, the leader of the parents of the 
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abducted girls also made a number of allegations about the #BBOG in his interview. He claimed 
that the movement has an account opened on behalf of the missing girls into which international 
bodies have been remitting funds. He explained that these funds were to be passed along to the 
girls and their parents, but that they had not been given any information about the money: 
 
They do not allow us to present our own grievances our own way. So as time goes by, you 
discover their movement has political undertone… as we continued on the journey, we 
discovered that bit by bit, they drifted to having political undertone, so we cut off with them, 
knowing what they are up to. (Interviewee 007- Chibok) 
 
8.2 Internal challenges 
Internally, the movement has grappled with numerous challenges. First, the movement had to 
deal with the migration of some its members from activism to government and the ripple effects 
of that online and offline. Those who had accused the group of being a tool in the hands of the 
opposition felt justified as some of them picked up appointment with the government of 
President Buhari who was in opposition as at the time of the abduction. 
 
Second, the movement had to resolve recurring disagreements over its strategies. While some 
activists wanted militancy; disruptive and unruly confrontation, others wanted a continuation of 
the pacifist and disciplined approach. When the pacifists won, some more militant activists left 
the movement. 
 
Third, the movement had to deal with the waning commitment of activists and low turnout at 
meetings, marches and protests. The #BBOG was meant to be a one day protest march. As it 
dragged on for years, activists’ commitment began to wane. In Lagos, there were, for several 
weeks, only two people at the sit-out. What must have been tiring was not just the physical 
stress of attending the daily sit-outs or regular marches but also the gruesome stories that were 
told at these meetings all the time. One of the movements’ Strategic team members noted that 
the constant conversation about Boko Haram and the situation in the North East has been:  
 
really a difficult thing to handle at times, because the stories are not really, really nice to 
hear… whenever we come, we hear stories of communities being attacked… numbers of 
people being killed, and number of women being abducted, the whole community being 
raised by fire you know, all these, it could be really drowning when we get such news. 
(Interviewee 008) 
 
Despite all these challenges, the #BBOG activists constantly reaffirmed their determination to 
attend the daily sit-outs, until every last one of the abducted Chibok girls had been brought 
home safely. 
 
 
9  Role of external actors  
The findings above showed that although #BBOG was internally formed, supported and driven 
by Nigerians, it benefited significantly from the support, approval and the moral and other 
legitimacy provided by external actors. The first point to be noted here is that external actors 
comprise of a wide array of players that include international donors, the international human 
rights community and civil society organisations, international media, faith based groups, foreign 
embassies located in Nigeria, international champions of the cause such as Michelle Obama, 
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the Nobel laureate, Malala who visited Nigeria, the House of Congress member, Representative 
Frederica Wilson and an intensely vocal Nigerian and African diaspora.  
 
Because the movement had made it clear that it was not receiving cash or money grants and 
donations from both governments and funders, external actors had to be more creative and 
innovative in their support of the cause. The strong global media presence through the CNN, 
BBC and Al Jazeera was an important element and the relentless support by media pundits 
such as Fareed Zakariah and Aisha Seesay put the movement and its cause into the global 
arena. Also, the several behind the scenes conversations between the Nigerian government, 
foreign embassies and foreign security and intelligence communities around the North East 
conflict must have had some elements of spin offs from the global amplification of the Chibok 
girls’ plight. 
 
Other evidence of the role of external actors included awards such as the International Human 
Rights Prize, the Emilio F. Mignone award for advocacy, the several invitations of its 
spokespersons to international meetings and the joint projects that were initiated in Nigeria 
around the documentation of missing persons. There were other efforts some of them not so 
benign by international ultra-right Christian groups particularly in the United States that 
campaigned and raised both funds and awareness around the abduction of Christian girls by 
Muslim terror groups. A significant set of external actors not often acceptable to the Nigerian 
authorities but who nevertheless kept the North East conflict and the plight of the Chibok girls 
alive were rights advocacy groups such as International Alert, Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International. The latter through its annual country reports, regular alerts and a physical 
presence in the country kept the Nigerian authorities particularly the military often uncomfortable 
through their revelations of atrocities and human rights abuse by all the parties in the conflict in 
the North East (Adebayo and Adeoye, CNN, 18 December 2018). International Aid agencies 
such as the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) were also active in the 
region particularly through their work with the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the camps 
set up for me. These provided more than mere relief support but also significant advocacy 
voices both within and outside Nigeria. 
 
The role of the Nigerian and African Diaspora in Europe and North America must also be 
recognised. In North America, there were champions such as Mojubaola Okome, Professor of 
Political Science at Brooklyn College, New York and prominent Diaspora rights activist who not 
only organised regular meetings and protests in New York but also actively contributed to the 
lobbying of supportive legislators in the US. Professor Okome’s social media handles, Twitter, 
Facebook and YouTube relentlessly kept the count of the days since the Chibok girls were 
abducted and also the count of the number still in captivity. 
 
What one learns from the #BBOG movement campaign is that first, there are a large number of 
external actors made up of: funders; the global and international media; international rights 
advocacy groups; international bilateral development agencies; international private 
development and relief agencies; the UN system; eminent individuals and advocates; and the 
African diaspora. Some of these overlap and they often operate in a wide range of ways that go 
beyond direct funding of local social and political actions. They can be champions for the social 
and political action speaking for it and taking it to significant and privileged spaces such as the 
UN, the parliaments of powerful and important world forums. They can also strengthen and 
reinforce the voice and visibility of the movements and social and political actions through a 
wider range of conventional media and social media interventions. They can support capacity 
building of advocacy skills and technologies as well as enable more grounded empowerment 
processes in country. They can also work with a vocal diaspora whose remittances are not only 
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monetary but also cultural, educational, technological and political. The #Bring Back Our Girls 
movement showed the many possibilities that are open to external actors in fragile, conflict- and 
violence-affected settings beyond their own direct presence, funding and the reliance on their 
own generated metrics of impact.  
 
 
10  Empowerment and accountability in 
FCVAS: lessons from the #BBOG 
To what extent do the activities and impact of the BBOG constitute empowerment and 
accountability? Whose empowerment? And what role does the setting and context play in all of 
these? 
 
The #Bring Back Our Girls movement, given its emergence, structure and purpose is a social 
movement that engaged in a battery of social and political actions. It is social in the sense of its 
emphasis on the collective, the relational and the interactive in the social arena. It is political in 
its presence in the public sphere where it engages the power relations inherent in the social 
contract that binds the state to the citizens and the governance norms of accountability and 
responsibility that go with these.  
 
Initially, the action expected of government was the use of any means to rescue and return the 
abducted schoolgirls. As time went on, this extended to provision of social good, good 
governance, and the adoption of policies that protect women and children in difficult parts of the 
country. In a deeper sense, the movement addressed the issues of gender-based violence in 
conflict settings, the issues of girls’ education and the imperative of making schools safe and 
secure for girls and boys. All of these were important elements of contemporary international 
human rights discourse and conditions of inclusive and just governance. From an initial singular 
focus on accountability demand-making, #BBOG entered into key issues of governance and 
gender justice. 
 
In what ways and to what extent has this action produced empowerment? Empowerment has 
been examined in the early part of this paper. The position here is one that recognises its 
nuanced complexity, its location in the individual and collective, its expression in both structure 
and agency along a continuum that can be weighted in terms of intensity and amplification and 
its presence in different spheres as varying and differentiated. Empowerment is therefore neither 
singular, monolithic nor unilineal. We see that the different stakeholders involved in the #BBOG 
expressed their experience of empowerment in different ways and to different extents. Figure 
10.1 below illustrates this. 
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Figure 10.1 BBOG stakeholders and levels of empowerment 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
In settings of conflict and violence, it is easier to neutralise the action and even existence of a 
lone-ranging activist, than that of a collective body. The coming together of a group of women 
and men in the #BBOG is in itself an expression of a kind of empowerment. Coming together 
empowered them to talk and be listened to. There are influential individuals among them – a 
former cabinet minister, for instance – yet there is little doubt that working together had 
accomplished much more than working alone could have. The movement brought together an 
inter-generational, inter-class, inter-religious and multi-ethnic group of members and activists. 
This is unique in recent Nigerian social mobilisation history. Often, in FCVAS, collective action 
increases visibility and synergy; more than that it provides security from possible vicious 
individualised attacks. 
 
The #BBOG’s social and political action empowered the activists involved in the movement. 
Through training and interaction, members gained skills and voice in management and activism. 
The abducted girls and their parents gained visibility that could have been impossible without the 
#BBOG movement. Those who have been rescued have been sponsored in schools within and 
outside Nigeria. BBOG linked them with key actors both nationally and internationally, including 
governments, civil society groups, business and international organisations. 
 
The Chibok community, through #BBOG movement, got local, national and global visibility. 
Empowering people, in FVCAS, may often involve registering them and their plight on the radar 
of public consciousness and providing a much needed public visibility. And if that is the only 
thing social and political action achieves, even that is worth recognition as peoples and 
communities that were invisibilised through marginalisation and exclusion are made visible 
through demand-making. 
 
This study leads us to understand that accountability, like empowerment, has different 
dimensions. There is social accountability which is what the #BBOG movement’s actions are 
focussed on.  For the #BBOG movement to ensure legitimacy in holding the government and 
rulers accountable for the return of the Chibok girls and consequently delivering on its mandate 
of security and safety of Nigerian citizens, it also established a core set of values and discipline 
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for which collectively they held themselves accountable. These core values were central to the 
movement’s legitimacy and helped it retain a focus on its larger mission and goals. 
 
The study found that the movement had significant success with making government and 
important government institutions such as the military, accountable along different dimensions.  
The first was increasing attention and scrutiny on the government and its agencies. In its various 
engagements, the #BBOG movement ensured the issue of the abducted Chibok girls was not 
swept under the carpet as in previous cases of abduction and the broader reign of threats to 
security of lives and property had been. Indeed, issues of security of life and property, as a 
sacred obligation of the state to the citizen, was kept constantly on the radar and government 
operatives were persistently reminded of their obligations. Viewed from this angle, #BBOG 
movement could be seen as a success. Keeping the government on its toes and ensuring no 
hiding place is one thing, eliciting desired outcome and results is a different matter. The #BBOG 
movement did both but along a continuum of varying intensity. 
 
The second element of social accountability here deals with the nature and extent of state 
response to the campaign’s demand-making and whether as a result of the daily sit-outs, 
protests, rallies, face-to-face meetings with government officials and online activism, there were 
indications of government’s adequate responsiveness to meet the demand of #BBOG group and 
secure the release of the remaining girls in captivity.   
 
Although it is difficult to adduce unilineal causality between #BBOG movement’s actions and 
government’s immediate responses, there are nevertheless instances where tangible results 
were recorded in terms of responsiveness and reactions. On 8 September 2015, President 
Muhammadu Buhari granted an interview with the BBC where he stated that the girls were 
scattered and being held in different locations while on 30 December 2015. The President 
contradicted his earlier statement by saying that the government had no credible intelligence on 
the location of the girls. This prompted the movement to request for a meeting with the President 
in State House with the parents of the girls in attendance. The request was granted. Apparently, 
the President was not pleased with the hot exchange that ensued at the meeting for which he 
was not fully prepared. He was reported to have abandoned the meeting abruptly in anger.  
 
Another major incident happened when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) at a press conference 
reeled out inaccurate statistics on the number of girls so far rescued from the Boko Haram 
insurgents. The following day, the #BBOG group addressed the press and challenged the 
submission of the COAS with another set of data in respect of the rescued girls. Subsequently, 
the office of the COAS redacted its earlier data and, in a rare display of humility the military 
apologised for the misinformation.  
 
The third major accountability outcome from the movement is the creation of a national missing 
persons’ register in collaboration with the Nigeria national human rights commission to support 
data and record keeping of persons missing in disasters and conflicts. The movement has also 
been instrumental in campaigns against corruption. 
 
Although communications lines between government officials and agents and #BBOG 
movement were not regular, it is clear that there is little evidence of proactive actions on the part 
of the government to the demands of the movement. It is not clear whether there were special 
sessions of the Federal Executive Council meeting, inter-agency deliberations or even 
designated desk officer in the Presidency to handle the demands of the movement. At another 
level, there is no record that lapses in the military or negligence by security agents that led to the 
abduction in the first place and palpable failure to secure the release of the girls was either 
investigated nor was there record of any officer held to account on the account of negligence or 
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incompetence around these issues. Of course, all of these are shrouded behind security matters 
and are not in the public domain. 
   
 
11  Conclusion 
The case of the #Bring Back Our Girls movement shows that empowerment and accountability 
can be connected in interesting ways. The #BBOG movement did not set out to empower 
people; it set out to make government accountable and responsive. In the process, 
empowerment happened. In this case, empowerment is a by-product of the demand and 
mobilisation for accountability. 
 
Does social and political action in fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings produce 
empowerment and accountability? Our findings suggests a cautious affirmative answer so far.  
Giving the time frame of our study and the ongoing nature of the #BBOG movement 
phenomenon, the jury on impact is not yet out. Firm conclusions on ongoing actions, possibly 
more unintended consequences and outcomes, and the spiralling multiplier effect of new 
organising and lessons learned by activists from their engagement in the #BBOG movement 
demand that we are cautious about indelible affirmations on outcomes. Also, the conditions of 
fragility that necessitated the social and political actions in the first instance are what restrict the 
impact of that actions. There is a circular determination as the condition produces the cause for 
action, circumvents the spaces for action while simultaneously generating opportunities for 
creative and innovative responses and initiatives. As we have noted, oftentimes, since we are 
studying an ongoing phenomenon, we are unable to make conclusive determinations. We are in 
the terrain of unintended consequences and unprecedented actions.  
 
Yet, whether or not it was their original intention, the action of #BBOG movement has so far 
produced empowerment, and a variety of accountability.  Some of these were unintended 
consequences of action. The way they acted and their stance with regards to the support of 
external actors particularly as regarding direct monetary support expressed unprecedented 
actions in the Nigerian context. The weighty lesson here is that each setting dictates what works 
and under what condition. For the Nigerian setting, militancy and unruly politics would have spelt 
doom for the movement. It would have given justifiable excuse for increased repressive action 
against the activists given the fact of ongoing military action and the factor of terrorism. The 
condition of non-militancy and internationalisation, a clear line between social-political action and 
partisan politics, internal group discipline, and a combination of old and new tools of protests are 
what it took the #BBOG movement to remain in activism and record its ongoing successes.  
 
In summarising the lessons learnt from this study, it is important to note that investment in social 
and political action in FCVAS is worthwhile as social and political actions do indeed produce 
intended and sometimes unintended (and as the case is in #BBOG movement, positive) 
outcomes. The terrain of social and political action remains dynamic and fertile with 
unrecognised and unpredictable opportunities and outcomes in building active citizens; passing 
on traditions and values of political engagements; and reinforcing the will to question and 
engage power, and thereby build more accountable polities and societies. It is important to also 
emphasise in closing, that the role of external actors is undeniably important – external meaning 
those not living in the location of the actions. However, this role must leave the setting of the 
agenda for actions with the national and local actors embedded in the context and at the front 
lines of the actions. This ensures that the agenda of the social and political actions is legitimate, 
effective, owned and relevant to the local situation. In the final analysis, the sustainability of any 
social transformation depends on its ownership and grounding in its context of origin. 
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Annexe   BBOG chants/mobilisation call 
 
Lead:       Group response: 
Lassa women…………………Bring them back now 
UNIMAID Lecturers…………. Bring them back home 
Chibok girls……………………Never to be forgotten 
 
Chorus: All we are saying Brick back our girls, now and alive 
 
What are we demanding? .....Bring back our girls now and alive! 
What are we asking? ............The truth and nothing but the truth! 
Where would we stop? ..........Not without our girls back alive! 
Where are we from? ............. Chibok! 
Who are we? .............………. Nigerians! 
What is our core value? ........ HUMANITEEDS! 
What are we fighting for?……The soul of Nigerians and the World! 
 
Chorus: The fight for our Chibok girls is the fight for the soul of Nigerians and the world! 
 
Mr President…………………. No more delays! 
Mr President……………….....No more excuses! 
Mr President…………………. Act now we want more results! 
1337 days too long………….. No more excuses! (Number of days not static) 
1337 days too long………….. No more delays! 
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